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PROCESS & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED V. NIGERIA: 
EXCEPTION UNDER THE FSIA WHEN AWARD HAS BEEN SET 
ASIDE BY A COURT OF THE COUNTRY “UNDER THE LAW OF 
WHICH” THE AWARD WAS MADE 
 
In March 2018, Process & Industrial Developments Limited 
(P&ID) filed a petition at the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to confirm an arbitral award against the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. The proceedings were conducted in 
three phases – jurisdictional, liability, and damages. The arbitration 
provision in the underlying contract hardly represented a model of 
clarity. It provided for the application of the Nigerian arbitration 
act to any dispute between the parties. On the other hand, it specified 
London as the “venue” of the proceedings. This posed a problem as 
to whether Nigeria was the juridical seat of the arbitration, in which 
case a Nigerian court would be the competent authority to set aside 
any award rendered by the tribunal. The Nigerian Federal High 
Court indeed vacated the liability award. At the confirmation stage 
in the D.C. District Court, the question arose as to whether the 
arbitration exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
is applicable in this case, consequently preventing Nigeria from 
invoking its sovereign immunity against suits in the United States. 
This note explores the parameters of the arbitration exception under 
the FSIA. Specifically, this note suggests that the applicable law to 
the arbitration was Nigerian law based on the language of the 
provision. As a corollary, A Nigerian court had the competence to 
set aside any award rendered in the proceedings. I adopt the view 
that Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, in addition to 
applicable U.S. case law, imply that the Nigerian court’s decision 
was valid.  As such, there was no existing award upon which P&ID 
could base its action to confirm the award. The arbitration exception 
was not applicable in this case, as the existence of a valid award is a 
pre-requisite for the application of the exception under the FSIA. 
Ndifreke Uwem 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Most parties coming to the United States to enforce 
foreign arbitral awards proceed under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”).1 The FAA gives U.S. federal courts the power to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate by compelling arbitration, 
staying litigation in the federal courts, and confirming and 
enforcing arbitral awards. Chapter 2 of the FAA gives 
domestic effect to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(the “New York Convention”), thus making the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards under the Convention a matter of 
federal rather than state law. According to section 203 of the 
FAA, U.S. federal district courts have original jurisdiction 
over actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards.  
  The issuance of an arbitral award is thus not the end of 
the road to redress. The process of obtaining recognition and 
attaching assets in aid of execution of an arbitral award in the 
United States can be a complex process involving multiple 
sets of statutes and procedural rules. When it involves a 
foreign state, additional challenges arise. Where there is no 
voluntary compliance with the award, the winning party will 
have to decide whether to commence recognition and 
enforcement proceedings and seek attachment of assets to 
obtain satisfaction of the award. 
  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) grants 
foreign states immunity from legal actions in the United 
States unless one of the several exceptions described in 
sections 1605 to 1607 of the Act applies.2 Thus, a foreign state 
                                                 
 
 
1 9 U.S.C.§§ 1-16, 201-208,301-307 (2018). 
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607; Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)  
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may become subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if it 
waives its claim of immunity, either explicitly or implicitly,3 
engaged in commercial activity,4 expropriated property in 
violation of international law,5 gained rights to property 
situated in the United States,6 engaged in certain types of 
tortious activity giving rise to personal injury or death in the 
United States,7 or brought an action to enforce an arbitration 
agreement or confirm an award pursuant to the agreement 
where the arbitration takes place in the U.S., or the award is 
governed by a treaty to which the U.S. is a signatory.8 This 
last exception is often referred to as the arbitration exception.  
The claimant in Process and Industrial Developments Limited v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria9 filed a petition in the D.C. district 
court for confirmation of an award rendered in an arbitration 
proceeding against the respondent, Nigeria. Process and 
Industrial Development Limited (“P&ID”) invoked, among 
other things, the arbitration exception in order to circumvent 
Nigeria’s sovereign immunity against suits in U.S. courts. 
P&ID submitted before the D.C. district court that, on the 
basis of this exception, Nigeria has no sovereign immunity 
defense to confirmation of the award. Nigeria on the other 
                                                 
 
 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000). 
4 Id. § 1605(a)(2) 
5 Id. § 1605(a)(3) 
6 Id. § 1605(a)(4) 
7 Id. § 1605(a)(5) 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (this exception was added in 1988 to address 
actions for enforcement or confirmation of arbitral awards to which a 
foreign state is a party). 
9 No. 18-cv-00594-CRC (D.D.C. filed Mar.16, 2018). 
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hand argued against the application of the arbitration 
exception asserted by P&ID.10  
  This Note argues that in this case, Nigeria is entitled to 
sovereign immunity under the FSIA because, based on the 
current position of the law, the arbitration exception does not 
apply here. Part II discusses the jurisdictional requirements 
for confirmation of an arbitral award against a sovereign state 
in the United States, including questions pertaining to 
subject-matter jurisdiction, due process concerns under the 
FSIA as well as personal jurisdiction under the arbitration 
exception of the FSIA. Part III recounts the relevant facts in 
P&ID v. Nigeria, from the pre-arbitration dispute, through the 
arbitral proceedings resulting in a liability award, to the 
judicial proceedings for annulment of the award and the 
further arbitral proceedings to determine the amount of 
damages. Part IV discusses Nigeria’s sovereign immunity vis-
à-vis the jurisdiction of the D.C. district court to confirm the 
award. This Note concludes that P&ID failed to satisfy the 
legal requirements for application of the arbitration exception 
to sovereign immunity.  Thus, the D.C. district court lacks 
jurisdiction under the FSIA to confirm the award because the 
arbitration exception does not apply in this case.    
 
II. JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD 
AGAINST A SOVEREIGN STATE IN U.S. 
COURTS. 
 
                                                 
 
 
10 At the time of this Note, the D.C. district court was yet to rule on the 
confirmation of the award. 
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  The recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitral awards in the United States is based primarily on the 
New York Convention.11 Chapter 2 of the FAA implements 
the New York Convention in the United States. Section 207 
thereof mandates that the court shall confirm the award 
“unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of 
recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said 
Convention.” However, in order for U.S. courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over a claim, there must be both subject-matter 
jurisdiction as well as personal jurisdiction.  
 
A. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE FSIA 
 
  Foreign states historically enjoyed absolute immunity 
in U.S. courts. However, the situation changed in 1952, when 
the State Department issued a so-called Tate Letter, 
announcing that it would be adhering to the policy of 
“restrictive sovereign immunity,”12 which extends immunity 
to claims involving foreign states’ public acts and does not 
extend to suits based on its private commercial conduct. The 
principles of restrictive immunity were codified in 1976 when 
                                                 
 
 
11 There is also the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the Panama Convention) codified in Chapter 3 
of the FAA. The Panama Convention typically applies where a majority of 
the parties to an arbitration agreement are from signatory countries to the 
Panama Convention and are members of the Organization of American 
States (OAS). Thus, because Nigeria is neither a signatory to the Panama 
convention nor a member of the OAS, our primary focus in this Note will 
be on the New York Convention. 
12 The Tate Letter, from Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor of the 
United States Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, the Acting United 
States Attorney General, reprinted in 6 Digest of International Law. 
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U.S. Congress passed the FSIA. The FSIA was amended in 
1988 to include the arbitration exception.13 The relevant 
section of the FSIA provides that: 
  A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in 
any case –  
(6) in which the action is brought, either to 
enforce an agreement made by the foreign 
state with or for the benefit of a private party 
to submit to arbitration all or any differences 
which have arisen or which may arise 
between the parties with respect to a defined 
legal relationship, whether contractual or 
not, concerning a subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the laws of 
the United States, or to confirm an award 
made pursuant to such an agreement to 
arbitrate, if …(B) the agreement or award is 
or may be governed by a treaty or other 
international agreement in force for the 
United States calling for the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards…14 
 
  This means that a foreign state with an arbitral award 
rendered against it is not immune to U.S. enforcement 
                                                 
 
 
13 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6), supra note 8. Prior to 1988, a claimant could 
conceivably and did enforce arbitral awards under the waiver exception 
but the 1988 amendments eliminated any doubts as to the applicability of 
the waiver exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
14 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1) and 1605(a)(6). 
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jurisdiction if that award is governed by the New York 
Convention. 
Further, Section 1330(a) of Title 28, provides that: 
  
  The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction without regard to amount in 
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a 
foreign state…, as to any claim for relief in 
personam with respect to which the foreign 
state is not entitled to immunity either under 
…this title or under any applicable international 
agreement. 
 
 Taken together, Sections 1605(a)(6) and 1330(a) provide 
subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA when a party 
brings an action in  a U.S. court to enforce an arbitral award 
against a foreign state. The Supreme Court has held that the 
FSIA provides “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a 
foreign state” in U.S. courts.15  But the jurisdictional analysis 
does not stop there. In addition to subject-matter jurisdiction, 
the court must also have personal jurisdiction over the 
sovereign state. 
 
B. DUE PROCESS ISSUES UNDER THE FSIA 
 
  Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA 
which is relatively straight-forward, personal jurisdiction 
presents a little bit of a concern vis-à-vis the due process 
requirement of the constitution. In the years since the FSIA 
was enacted, courts have struggled to identify whether and to 
                                                 
 
 
15 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
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what extent the constitutional aspects of personal jurisdiction 
apply to foreign states. This debate has its roots in Title 28 of 
the United States Code, section 1330(b), which states that 
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to 
every claim for relief over which the district courts have 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made 
under section 1608 of this title.”16 Section 1330(a), quoted 
above, when read together with 1330(b), suggest that “the 
[FSIA] makes the statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction 
simple: subject-matter jurisdiction plus service of process 
equals personal jurisdiction.”17 
  This state of affairs gave rise to some confusion, with 
courts struggling to coordinate the language of section 1330 
with common law constitutional principles concerning 
personal jurisdiction. For example, some courts have relied on 
section 1330(b) to hold that a party may not assert a lack of 
personal jurisdiction if one of the exceptions to immunity 
exists and service of process is proper.18 Consequently, under 
these reasoning, there is no need to demonstrate the same sort 
of “minimum contacts” that are normally required to 
establish personal jurisdiction as a matter of U.S. 
constitutional law.19  
                                                 
 
 
16 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). 
17 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 
308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
18 See, e.g., Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 994 F. Supp. 1929, 1312 (D. 
Colo. 1998); M.B.L. Int’l Contractors v. Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 
52, 56 (D.D.C. 1989); Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm’n, 604 F. Supp. 
703, 710 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 808 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
19 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (describing the 
constitutional “minimum contacts” analysis); see generally GARY B. BORN 
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Regarding the FAA, U.S. courts have in the past reviewed the 
rights of private individuals in actions to enforce arbitral 
awards and have considered the question of personal 
jurisdiction therein.20 These cases make clear that subject-
matter jurisdiction arises out of the provisions of Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution which divide power among the 
branches of government. Personal jurisdiction arises out of a 
completely separate area, namely the Due Process Clause. 
The two issues cannot be collapsed into a single analysis. 
  The Second Circuit recognized this in Texas Trading & 
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,21 an early FSIA case. 
There, the court stated that “the [FSIA] cannot create personal 
jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it.”22 Many U.S. 
courts have followed Texas Trading and undertaken separate 
constitutional analyses after evaluating the statutory 
elements of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA.23 Although 
                                                 
 
 
& DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS: 
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 31-33 (1992) (describing the evolution of 
personal jurisdiction requirements from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1878) to Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).  
20 See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC 
“Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 F.3d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 101 (2002); Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v. Saudi 
Chartering, 622 F. Supp 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
21 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 
(2d Cir. 1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the 
FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
22 Id. at 308. 
23 See, e.g., S & Davis Int’l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303-
04 (11th Cir. 2000); T.H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174 
F.2d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1998); Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 759 F. Supp. 855, 860-61 (D.D.C. 1991); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. 
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courts in other circuits, including the Eleventh and Ninth 
Circuits as well as the D.C. district court, followed Texas 
Trading, others began to question it on grounds that foreign 
states may not be “persons” within the meaning of the U.S. 
Constitution and therefore may not be entitled to the same 
“minimum contacts” analysis that private parties are entitled 
to claim.24 This rationale came from the Supreme Court 
decision in Argentina v. Weltover, although ironically the 
decision assumed, without specifically holding, that a foreign 
state was a “person” under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.25 However, the Court’s opinion reflected a 
reluctance to extend due process protections to foreign states, 
should the question ever arise in the future. In so doing, the 
Court relied heavily on a previous decision holding that 
individual U.S. states are not “persons” under the Due 
Process Clause.26  
  In 1981, when the Second Circuit held in Texas Trading 
that a foreign state was a “person” within the meaning of the 
U.S. Constitution, it engaged in only a cursory analysis of the 
subject.27 Because Texas Trading is not binding outside of the 
Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit was able to do its own 
analysis of the constitutional status of foreign states in the 
                                                 
 
 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.D.C. 
1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
24 See, e.g., S & Davis Int’l Inc., 218 F.3d at 1303; Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of 
the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
25 Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). 
26 Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)). 
27 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 
313 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the 
FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
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2002 case of Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.28 
There, the D.C. Circuit concluded that foreign states are not 
“persons” as a matter of U.S. constitutional law and are 
therefore exempt from due process protections of personal 
jurisdiction.29 According to Price, courts faced with actions 
under the FSIA need not consider the amount and type of 
contacts between a foreign state and the United States, but 
instead need only adopt the statutory “subject-matter 
jurisdiction plus service of process” test described above.30 
It was unclear whether Price, which arose under section 
1605(a)(7) (the terrorism exception) would apply to 
enforcement actions under section 1605(a)(6) (the arbitration 
exception) of the FSIA. However, in 2005, the D.C. Circuit 
demonstrated its willingness to extend the principles of Price 
to actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards in TMR Energy 
Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine.31  
 
C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE 
ARBITRATION EXCEPTION 
 
i. Earlier Case Law 
 
  Majority of available case law discuss the issue of 
personal jurisdiction under the arbitration exception in 
combination with the implied waiver exception under section 
                                                 
 
 
28 Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
29 Id. at 99. 
30 Id.; Supra note 17. 
31 TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
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1605(a)(1).32 The two arguments are very closely linked such 
that it is sometimes unclear whether the courts will allow a 
party to argue jurisdiction based only on the arbitration 
exception. For instance, the plaintiff in TMR Energy explicitly 
denied its reliance on the implied waiver exception in the trial 
court, choosing instead to focus on the arbitration exception.33 
Nevertheless, the D.C. District Court raised the implied 
waiver issue sua sponte, eventually basing its decision on those 
grounds despite the defendant’s claim that a court may not 
consider jurisdictional grounds explicitly avoided by the 
plaintiff.34 
  Questions often arise as to the existence of personal 
jurisdiction under the arbitration exception where there is a 
distinction between a sovereign state itself and an agency of 
the sovereign state. Two cases have held that subject-matter 
existed but both are questionable on personal jurisdiction 
grounds. For instance, S & Davis International v. Republic of 
Yemen involved an arbitral award against a Yemeni 
corporation that was held to be an agency or instrumentality 
                                                 
 
 
32 See TMR Energy Ltd., 411 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2005); S & Davis Int’l Inc. v. 
Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t 
of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T 
Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993); Seetransport Wiking Trader 
Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 
572 (2d Cir. 1993); Maritime Ventures Int’l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading and 
Fidelity, Ltd., 732 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); M.B.L. Int’l Contractors 
v. Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1989) (involving an 
arbitral award, but argued under the implied waiver exception rather than 
the arbitration exception). 
33 Brief of Appellant State Property Fund of Ukraine, p.25. 
34 Id. at 25, 30 (citing World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 
296 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003)). 
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of the state of Yemen.35 There was some question as to 
whether the exception could apply against Yemen itself, since 
it was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement resulting 
in the award, but the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant 
corporation was under the control of the state and therefore 
section 1605(a)(6) applied.36  The Eleventh Circuit addressed 
the question of personal jurisdiction separately from that of 
subject-matter jurisdiction but did not discuss its reasons for 
undertaking a constitutional due process analysis. Instead, 
the court avoided the issue of whether a foreign state is a 
“person” under the U.S. Constitution, preferring to hold that, 
in any event, the constitutional elements of personal 
jurisdiction were met in these circumstances.37  
  Although the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is 
evenhanded in many respects, it provides an avenue for those 
who believe that a state’s agreement to arbitrate a dispute 
opens that state up to enforcement proceedings in virtually 
any country38 by indicating that it is “only ‘fair and just’ [for 
a plaintiff] to seek enforcement of the outcome of a good faith 
agreement to arbitrate.”39  The court also held that this sort of 
enforcement action “comports with the minimum contacts 
determination that the defendant ‘should reasonably 
                                                 
 
 
35 S & Davis Int’l, 218 F.3d at 1292.  
36 Id. at 1302. 
37 Id. at 1303. 
38 Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does it Matter?: Personal 
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 179-84 (2001). 
39 S & Davis Int’l, 218 F.3d at 1304-05 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
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anticipate being haled into court’ in the forum’s 
jurisdiction.”40 
  Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar also 
involved the successful application of the arbitration 
exception to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, although 
the primary question here was whether the arbitration 
exception could be applied retroactively, which was 
answered in the affirmative.41 However, the D.C. Circuit 
separated its discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction from its 
discussion of personal jurisdiction, stating that “although 
subsection (a)(6) confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
court, it does not follow that Qatar waived its objection to 
personal jurisdiction.”42 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit claimed that 
“the decisions of which we are aware have held that an 
implicit waiver of personal jurisdiction in a defendant’s 
agreement to litigate or to arbitrate in a particular jurisdiction 
is applicable only within that jurisdiction.”43 Thus, “[i]t seems 
…implausible that Qatar, by agreeing to arbitrate in France, a 
signatory to a treaty containing a similar reciprocal 
‘recognition and enforcement’ clause, should be deemed 
thereby to have waived its right to challenge personal 
jurisdiction in the United States.”44 This, of course, takes the 
opposite view of S & Davis by suggesting that courts that rely 
on the arbitration exception must do more than simply 
establish the existence of an arbitral award before concluding 




41 Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). The retroactivity of the FSIA was confirmed by the U.S.  
Supreme Court in Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
42 Id. at 126. 
43 Id. (citations omitted). 
44 Id. at 127. 
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that personal jurisdiction exists.45 Although the D.C. Circuit 
was influenced by the fact that Qatar was not a signatory to 
the New York Convention, the case provides a useful analysis 
of section 1605(a)(6)’s ability to confer personal jurisdiction, 
as opposed to its ability to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
ii. TMR Energy 
 
  TMR Energy assumes additional importance 
considering the lack of case law regarding personal 
jurisdiction and enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
FSIA. TMR Energy followed the holding in Price – that foreign 
states are not entitled to due process protections under the 
U.S. Constitution. Thus, based on this principle from Price, the 
outcome in TMR Energy was somewhat certain. As the D.C. 
Circuit stated, “[the State Property Fund of Ukraine] – like its 
principal, the State of Ukraine – is not a ‘person’ for purposes 
of the due process clause and cannot invoke the minimum 
contacts test to avoid the personal jurisdiction of the district 
court.”46 Both TMR Energy and Price relied heavily on the fact 
that individual U.S. states are not considered “persons” under 
the Due Process Clause and that it therefore “would be highly 
incongruous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to 
foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional 
system, than are afforded to the states, who help make up the 
fabric of that system.”47  




46 TMR Energy, Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
47 Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 
(1966)). See also TMR Energy, Ltd., 411 F.3d at 300. 
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III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
OF P&ID v. NIGERIA 
 
A. THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE GIVING RISE TO THE 
ARBITRATION 
 
The dispute arose out of a Gas Supply and Processing 
Agreement (the “GSPA”) dated January 11, 2010 between 
P&ID and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”).48 Under the GSPA, P&ID 
was to obtain “Wet Gas” for free from Nigeria and convert it 
into “Lean Gas,” which Nigeria could use to power electric 
plants.49 According to a witness statement submitted by 
P&ID, P&ID would not charge Nigeria for converting the Wet 
Gas. Rather, in exchange for the Wet Gas, P&ID would have 
the right to keep certain by-products – Natural Gas Liquids 
(“NGLs”) – and sell them on the open market.50  
  Beginning in mid-2006, P&ID began exploring the 
feasibility of the project and commissioned various studies 
and engineering plans.51 This culminated in the execution of 
the GSPA in 2010. Under the GSPA, P&ID was obligated to 
build a gas processing facility and Nigeria was to supply the 
facility with Wet Gas from two oil mining leases operated by 
Addax Petroleum and Exxon Mobil.52  
                                                 
 
 
48 Process and Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. The Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Final Award, (Jan. 31, 2017) ¶ 2. 
49 Id. 
50 First Witness Statement of Michael Quinn, Feb. 10, 2014. ¶ 65. 
51 Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. 
52 GSPA §§ 3(a), 3(c). 
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  In March 2011, Addax informed P&ID that it was 
unwilling to supply the amount of Wet Gas envisioned by the 
GSPA.53 P&ID attempted to negotiate a compromise, which 
Addax initially supported but ultimately rejected in June of 
2012.54 At this point, the project fell apart.  
 
B. THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS RESULTING IN A 
LIABILITY AWARD 
 
  On August 22, 2012, P&ID commenced arbitration 
against Nigeria. P&ID filed for arbitration pursuant to section 
20 of the GSPA, which contains a choice of law clause and an 
arbitration clause. The relevant part of the arbitration 
agreement states as follows: 
 “The Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” 
  The Parties agree that if any difference or dispute 
arises between them concerning the interpretation or 
performance of this Agreement and if they fail to settle such 
difference or dispute amicably, then a Party may serve on the 
other a notice of arbitration under the rules of the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Cap A18 LFN 2004) which, 
except as otherwise provided herein, shall apply to any dispute 
between such Parties under this Agreement. 
  “The venue of the arbitration shall be London, England or 
otherwise as agreed by the Parties. The arbitration 
                                                 
 
 
53 Process and Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. The Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Part Final Award, (Jul. 17, 2015) ¶ 38(a). 
54 Id. at ¶¶ 38(c)-(d). 
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proceedings and record shall be in the English language”.55 
(emphasis added). 
  Pursuant to that agreement, P&ID served notice of the 
arbitration on Nigeria. The tribunal was then constituted with 
three arbitrators, two of whom were English and one 
Nigerian.56 The tribunal issued several procedural orders 
with the heading as “In the Matter of an Arbitration Under 
the Rules of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of Nigeria” 
and issued other directions for parties to comply with 
provisions of the Nigerian Arbitration Act.57  
  On October 11, 2013, P&ID wrote to Nigeria to “invite 
you agree” that certain preliminary objections raised by 
Nigeria be decided “pursuant to Section 31(4) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996,” the law governing arbitrations in 
England.58 In a letter dated October 14, 2013, Nigeria declined 
that invitation and responded that it would proceed “as 
contemplated by the parties under the Nigerian Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act.”59 In a response letter dated October 24, 
2013, P&ID acknowledged that the parties had agreed to 
arbitrate under the Rules of the Nigerian Arbitration Act, but 
asserted for the first time that it had referenced England’s 
“Arbitration Act of 1996” because it believed “the juridical 
seat of this arbitration is London.”60 
                                                 
 
 
55 GSPA § 20. 
56 Process & Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria & Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, Petition to Confirm 
Arbitration Award ¶ 18, No. 18-594, WL 3359784 (D.D.C. 2018). 
57 Witness Declaration of Seamus Ronald Andrew in Support of Petition 
to Confirm Arbitration Award, Mar. 16, 2018, Exhibit 11 at 35-63. 
58 Id. at 44. 
59 Id. at 46. 
60 Id. at 47. 
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  In subsequent procedural orders, the Tribunal began 
to style the proceedings with reference to both the Nigerian 
and English arbitration laws: “In the Matter of the Arbitration 
Act 1996 (England and Wales) and In the Matter of an 
Arbitration Under the Rules of the Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act 1988.”61 The Tribunal further divided the 
proceedings into three parts relating to jurisdiction, liability, 
and damages. On July 3, 2014, the tribunal issued a decision 
on jurisdiction. Although the agreement seemed to only 
reference London, England as a “venue,” the Tribunal applied 
the English Arbitration Act to conclude that it had 
jurisdiction.62 Thus, the arbitration proceeded to the liability 
phase, and on July 17, 2015, the Tribunal issued an award on 
liability. The Tribunal held that the GSPA was valid and 
authorized, and that Nigeria was liable for breaching it.63  
 
C. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS TO SET ASIDE THE 
LIABILITY AWARD AND THE FURTHER ARBITRATION 
RESULTING IN A DAMAGES AWARD 
 
Upon finding Nigeria liable, and before the Tribunal rendered 
its decision on damages, Nigeria sought judicial assistance to 
have the arbitration enjoined and the liability award set aside. 
Nigeria contended that given the parties’ express agreement 
to arbitrate under the rules of the Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, a Nigerian court was the competent 
authority to supervise the arbitration and annul any award 
                                                 
 
 
61 Id. at 107. 
62 Id. Exhibit 7 at 36. 
63 Id. Exhibit 8 at 54, 80. 
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made pursuant to the agreement. However, Nigeria also 
applied for annulment in England. 
  The Commercial Court in London denied Nigeria’s 
application as untimely.64 Nigeria then applied to set aside 
the award before the Federal High Court in Lagos, Nigeria, 
arguing that the parties had agreed to arbitrate under the 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act and therefore had 
“effectively agreed that the seat of the arbitration is 
Nigeria.”65 Nigeria further argued that London was “only the 
venue for hearings in the arbitration; a geographically 
convenient place.”66 Nigeria also moved to enjoin parties 
from continuing the arbitral proceedings pending resolution 
of the set aside motion. On April 20, 2016, the Nigerian court 
granted the injunction.67  
  P&ID did not participate in the Nigerian court 
proceedings.68 Instead, it asked the Tribunal to determine the 
seat of the arbitration.69 Nigeria opposed the request, arguing 
that the determination of the seat was not in controversy.70 
Nigeria asserted that the seat of the arbitration was Nigeria 
because the GSPA was governed by Nigerian law and 
because the parties had expressly agreed to arbitrate under 
the rules of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.71 
On April 26, 2016, the Tribunal concluded that by designating 
London as the “venue,” the parties had selected London as 
                                                 
 
 
64 Id. Exhibit 11 at 154, 162. 
65 Id. at 2-4. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. Exhibit 16 at 44-48. 
68 Id. at 38. 
69 Id. Exhibit 12. 
70 Id. Exhibit 16 at 36.  
71 Id. Exhibit 12 at 6. 
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the only seat of the arbitration, notwithstanding their express 
agreement to arbitrate under the Nigerian Arbitration Act.72 
Shortly thereafter, on May 24, 2016, the Nigerian court issued 
an order setting aside the liability award.73 
  Despite the Nigerian judgment setting aside the 
liability award, the Tribunal proceeded to the damages phase. 
Nigeria participated in the further proceedings but 
maintained the position that the liability award had been set 
aside in Nigeria.74 On January 31, 2017, the Tribunal issued 
the damages award.75 On March 16, 2018, P&ID filed a 
Petition at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking to confirm the award and alleging that approximately 
$9 billion is due on the award. 
 
IV. NIGERIA’S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT. 
 
  Nigeria is a foreign state as defined in the FSIA.76 And 
the FSIA is the “sole basis” for establishing jurisdiction over a 
foreign state with respect to any claim for which it is not 
entitled to sovereign immunity.77 A foreign state is entitled to 
                                                 
 
 
72 Id. ¶¶ 1-40. 
73 Id. Exhibit 13. 
74 Id. Exhibits 14 and 15; see also Process & Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. 
Republic of Nigeria & Ministry of Petroleum Resources of the Fed. 
Republic of Nigeria, Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award ¶ 26, No. 18-
594, WL 3359784 (D.D.C. 2018). 
75 Id. Exhibit 17. 
76 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
77 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 439 (1989), and citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 
U.S. 480, 488-89 (1983)). 
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“virtually absolute immunity” from suit unless the 
“substantive requirements” of any one of the exceptions to 
immunity are satisfied.78 Thus, “[i]f no exception applies, a 
foreign sovereign’s immunity under the FSIA is complete,” 
and the district court lacks jurisdiction over the case.79  
Further, a court is obligated to make the sovereign immunity 
determination at the outset, and a foreign state is not required 
to assert its substantive defenses against confirmation of an 
award until that “threshold determination of FSIA immunity” 
has been conclusively and authoritatively resolved.80 
 
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION EXCEPTION. 
 
  In Chevron v. Ecuador, the D.C. Circuit established a 
three-part test that a petitioner must satisfy for the arbitration 
exception to apply.81 The first step is determining that the 
award is or may be “governed by a treaty signed by the 
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards.”82 The New York Convention is such a treaty. 
A district court must then make two additional findings: (1) 
                                                 
 
 
78 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486, 489; accord Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312 (2017). 
79 Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
80 Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, 735 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 
2013); Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Posner, J.) (“A foreign government should not be put to the expense of 
defending what may be a protracted lawsuit without an opportunity to 
obtain an authoritative determination of its amendability to suit at the 
earliest possible opportunity.”). See also Helmerich & Payne, 137 S. Ct. at 
1317, 1319, 1324. 
81 795 F.3d at 204. 
82 Id. 
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the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) the 
existence of an enforceable award.83 A “non-frivolous claim 
involving an arbitration award” is not enough to sustain 
jurisdiction; the Court must determine that each of these 
requirements has actually been met.84 Although these 
jurisdictional questions may overlap with a foreign state’s 
defenses under the New York Convention,85 a court must still 
answer them before it takes jurisdiction.86 Because the lability 
award was set aside by a Nigerian court, P&ID could not 
claim to have an existing award and therefore could not 
satisfy all the requirements to abrogate Nigeria’s immunity 
under the arbitration exception. 
  In Chevron, the D.C. Circuit considered whether a valid 
arbitration agreement existed for purposes of satisfying the 
arbitration exception, even though that argument was 
“largely coextensive” with Ecuador’s defenses “against 
confirmation of the award under the New York 
Convention.”87 The district court asserted jurisdiction merely 
because the proceedings involved confirmation of an arbitral 
award under the New York Convention, but “eschewed” the 
question of whether a valid arbitration agreement existed for 
purposes of satisfying the arbitration exception to 
immunity.88 The court of appeals held that “this was error,” 





85 Id. at 207. 
86 Id. at 205. 
87 795 F.3d at 207. See also New York Convention, art. V(1)(a) (providing 
that a court may refuse to enforce an award if the respondent proves that 
the arbitration agreement “is not valid”). 
88 795 F.3d at 205 n.3 (reasoning that Ecuador could not have “two bites at 
the apple of the merits of its dispute,” i.e., one under the FSIA and another 
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and that the district court had to decide whether the parties 
had in fact agreed to arbitrate “as part of its jurisdictional 
analysis.”89 Likewise, the “existence of an award” is an issue 
that the Court “must resolve in order to maintain 
jurisdiction.”90 Thus, if there is “no award to enforce,” then 
the Court “lacks jurisdiction over the foreign state and the 
action must be dismissed.”91 
  In P&ID v. Nigeria, jurisdiction is unavailable under the 
arbitration exception because there is no award to enforce. 
The question of whether an award exists, like the question of 
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, is “largely 
coextensive” with one of the grounds for resisting 
enforcement under the New York Convention.92 Under 
Article V(1)(e), an award “does not exist to be enforced” if it 
has been “lawfully ‘set aside’ by a competent authority” at the 
seat of the arbitration, i.e., the primary jurisdiction for 
annulling the award.93 Article V(1)(e) states, in relevant part: 
  Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, 
only if that party furnishes . . . proof that  . . .  [t]he award . . . 
                                                 
 
 
under the New York Convention, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
89 795 F.3d at 205 n.3. 
90 Id. at 204. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 207. 
93 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(refusing to enforce an award that had been set aside in Colombia) (citing 
Baker Marine (Nigeria) v. Chevron (Nigeria), 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(denying confirmation of an award that had been set aside in Nigeria)). 
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has been set aside . . . by a competent authority of the country 
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.94 
  The New York Convention “provides two tests for 
determining which country has primary jurisdiction over an 
arbitration award: a country in which an award is made, and 
a country under the law of which an award is made.”95 
 
iii. Nigeria is the Country “under the Law of 
which” the Award Was Made 
 
  The phrase “under the law of which” points to “the 
procedural law governing the arbitration.”96 In Belize Social 
Development, the D.C. Circuit found that a court in London 
was a competent authority to set aside the award where the 
parties’ agreement stated that any disputes would be 
“resolved by arbitration under the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules.”97 Similarly, in Baker 
Marine, a Nigerian court was considered to be the competent 
authority to set aside the award under the parties’ arbitration 
agreement, which provided that any dispute would be 
“settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration 
                                                 
 
 
94 New York Convention, art. V(1)(e). 
95 Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas 
Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 308 (5th Cir. 2004). 
96 Belize Soc. Dev., Ltd. v. Government of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 731 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (noting that the phrase “under the law of which” refers to the 
“procedural law under which the arbitration was conducted”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5-12 (Am. 
Law. Inst. 2010) (“RESTATEMENT”). See also RESTATEMENT § 5-12(d) (“For 
purposes of this Section [Article V(1)(e) of the NY Convention], a 
Convention award is deemed to be made under the law of the country 
whose arbitration law governed the arbitral proceedings.”).  
97 668 F.3d at 728. 
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Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)” and “specified that the arbitration 
‘procedure (insofar as not governed by said UNCITRAL rules 
. . .) shall be governed by the substantive laws of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.’”98 
  Here, P&ID and Nigeria expressly agreed on Nigerian 
law as the procedural law that would govern the arbitration 
by agreeing to arbitrate “under the rules of the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act.”99 Thus, under Article 
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, a Nigerian court is a 
“competent authority” with “primary jurisdiction” to annul 
any award made pursuant to that agreement.100 That is what 
the Nigerian court did here when it set aside the liability 
award. 
  Further, because the liability award was “lawfully set 
aside” by a Nigerian court,101 there is no finding of liability on 
which the damages award can rest.102 This outcome cannot be 
                                                 
 
 
98 191 F.3d at 195 (ellipsis in original). 
99 GSPA § 20. Cf. Dixilyn-Field Drilling, Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 83 CIV 
9308 (LBS), 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17992, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1984) 
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stated that any disputes would be settled by arbitration “according to 
Arbitration Act of Nigeria”). 
100 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 935. 
101 Id. 
102 Cf. John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United Food & 
Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 562 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
annulment of an arbitral award that was rendered in disregard of a 
contrary liability determination in a prior judicial proceeding, and holding 
that the liability ruling precluded the losing party from presenting further 
evidence and “barred” the arbitrator “from reconsidering the issue”). See 
also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955 
(2d Cir. 1964). 
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avoided because the Tribunal and P&ID chose to ignore the 
Nigerian court’s judgement, and its injunction, and to 
proceed to the damages phase of the case. In short, the 
Nigerian judgment left the arbitrators with nothing to decide 
and the subsequent damages award would consequently be a 
nullity. 
 
iv. The D.C. Circuit is “obliged to Respect” the 
Nigerian Court’s Judgment Setting Aside the 
Liability Award. 
 
  The D.C. District Court, where the petition for 
confirmation was filed, is “obliged to respect” the Nigerian 
judgment.103 There is no basis to “second-guess” that 
judgment,104 unless P&ID shows that it has been “tainted,” or 
is anything “other than authentic,”105 or unless enforcing that 
judgment would offend “fundamental notions of what is 
decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.”106 
  In TermoRio, the award had been set aside by a 
competent court in Colombia, a primary jurisdiction under 
the New York Convention.107 Since there was no cause for 
questioning the Colombian judgment, the D.C. Circuit ruled 
that the award had been “lawfully set aside.”108 The court of 
appeals further noted that this was a “peculiarly Colombian 
affair,” insofar as it concerned “a dispute involving 
Colombian parties over a contract to perform services in 
                                                 
 
 
103 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 930 (citing Baker Marine). 
104 Id. at 937. 
105 Id. at 935. 
106 Id. at 938. 
107 Id. at 935. 
108 Id. 
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Colombia which led to a Colombian arbitration decision and 
Colombian litigation” in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement “to be bound by Colombian law.”109 The D.C. 
Circuit thus concluded that it was “in no position to 
pronounce the decision of [the Colombian court] wrong.”110 
  The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
Baker Marine. There, the court of appeals also affirmed the 
district court’s decision refusing to enforce an award that had 
been set aside by a Nigerian court, citing Article V(1)(e) and 
“principles of comity.”111 In rejecting the argument that the 
judgment of the Nigerian court should be ignored, the Second 
Circuit reasoned that it was “sufficient answer that the parties 
contracted in Nigeria that their disputes would be arbitrated 
under the laws of Nigeria.”112 It added that the “primary 
purpose” of the FAA is “ensuring that private agreements to 
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”113 It further 
explained that the petitioner had “made no contention that 
the Nigerian courts acted contrary to Nigerian law.”114 
Finally, it held that the Convention’s permissive language 
under Article V – providing that a court “may” refuse 
enforcement – did not afford the court any leeway to enforce 
an award annulled in Nigeria, as the petitioner had “shown 
no adequate reason for refusing to recognize the judgments 
of the Nigerian court.”115 
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  The same analysis applies here. P&ID acknowledged 
that the Nigerian court granted Nigeria’s motion to set aside 
the liability award.116 Absent substantial evidence that the 
Nigerian judgment was tainted by any irregularities that 
would offend the United States’ “fundamental notions of 
what is decent and just,” the D.C. District Court is bound to 
respect, uphold and apply it.117 Moreover, as in TermoRio and 
Baker Marine, this case involves a particularly foreign affair: 
the Nigerian state and a foreign company entered into a 
contract in Nigeria to perform services in Nigeria, which led 
to an arbitration award rendered under the arbitration law of 
Nigeria and then a Nigerian judgment setting aside that 
award in accordance with the parties’ agreement to be bound 
by the laws of Nigeria. There are zero ties to the United States. 
Like the D.C. Circuit in TermoRio, the D.C. district court in this 
case should decline any invitation to find error in the 
judgment of the Nigerian court. 
 
v. The Choice of an Arbitral “Venue” Does Not 
Affect the Nigerian Court’s Judgment. 
 
  The parties’ choice of a procedural law to govern the 
arbitration proceedings is the determinative factor in 
establishing the primary jurisdiction or seat for purposes of 
the New York Convention.118 The fact that the parties chose 
London as the “venue” for the arbitration proceedings does 
                                                 
 
 
116 See Process & Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria & 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, Petition 
to Confirm Arbitration Award ¶ 26, No. 18-594, WL 3359784 (D.D.C. 2018). 
117 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 936, 938. 
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not affect the Nigerian court’s primacy as a competent 
authority under Article V(1)(e). The selection of a geographic 
location for the hearings creates a presumption as to the seat 
of the arbitration only “in the absence of any express 
statement making another country’s procedural law 
applicable.”119 Here, the parties expressly agreed that the 
arbitration would be conducted “under the rules of the 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,” negating any 
presumption that they agreed on English procedural law by 
naming London as the “venue.”120 
  Indeed, it is possible for parties to choose one country 
to be the physical location for the arbitral proceedings, but 
choose a different country as the “seat” of the arbitration “in 
the legal sense.”121 Had the parties intended to choose 
London as the “legal” seat of the arbitration, they would have 
used the term “seat” or “site,” rather than “venue” or any 
other variation, to avoid ambiguity.122 In short, the parties did 
not agree on English procedural law by designating London 




120 GSPA § 20. 
121 Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 292 (finding that the award was “made in” 
Geneva in accordance with the parties’ presumptive agreement that Swiss 
procedural law applied, notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings 
“physically occurred in Paris”); RESTATEMENT § 5-12 cmt. b. (“[A]n award 
will be deemed to have been made at the arbitral seat regardless of where 
the hearings were actually held or the award was actually prepared or 
signed.”).  
122 Id. at 291 (finding that Switzerland was the “legal” seat where the 
parties had agreed that “the site of the arbitration shall be Geneva”) 
(emphasis added); 2 GARY B. BORN, INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1540 
(2d ed. 2014) (“The term ‘seat’ is distinctly preferable to either ‘forum’ or 
‘venue’; these latter terms imply that the designated location will be where 
meetings or hearings must be conducted . . . .”). 
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as the “venue.” Rather, they chose London as the location for 
the arbitration hearings and meetings. 
  Even if the selection of London as the “venue” were 
construed to be an agreement as to the legal seat of the 
arbitration, that conclusion still does not divest the Nigerian 
court of jurisdiction to annul the award under Article V(1)(e) 
of the New York Convention. By its terms, the Convention 
“suggests the potential for more than one country of primary 
jurisdiction.”123 For instance, in Karaha Bodas, the Fifth Circuit 
found that a Swiss court was the only competent authority 
under Article V(1)(e) because the parties had contractually 
designated the “site of the arbitration as Switzerland,” and 
had “not otherwise expressly identif[ied] the procedural law 
that would apply to the arbitration.”124 However, the court 
recognized that the parties could have agreed that “one 
country [would] be the site of the arbitration but the 
proceedings [would] be held under the arbitration law of 
another country,” in which case the courts of both countries 
could be competent to annul the award.125 The court declined 
to rule on this issue because “both of the New York 
Convention criteria for the country with primary jurisdiction 
point[ed] to Switzerland – and only to Switzerland.”126 
  Similarly, in Belize Social Development, the D.C. Circuit 
found that an English court was the only competent authority 
to set aside the award because the arbitration occurred in 
London and the parties expressly agreed to the arbitral laws 
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of England.127 In support of that conclusion, the D.C. Circuit 
cited section 5-12 of the Restatement, which is very clear on 
the effect of naming one country as the “seat” of the 
arbitration while at the same time expressly agreeing on the 
procedural law of another: “In that event, the award will be 
subject to the primary jurisdiction of authorities in two 
countries, both of whom will have competence to set it aside.”128 
Thus, even under this interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement, the Nigerian court retained primary jurisdiction 
to enjoin the proceedings and annul the liability award. Here, 
application of Nigerian procedural law forecloses any ruling 
that the United Kingdom and only the United Kingdom can 
be the competent jurisdiction to set aside the award. 
  Nothing that happened in the underlying arbitration 
or judicial proceedings detracts from this analysis. The 
Tribunal’s decision suggesting that there could only be one 
seat for the arbitration, is not binding on the D.C. district 
court.129 That question is one of interpretation of the New 
York Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a 
party. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Karaha Bodas, there are 
two tests for identifying a primary jurisdiction under Article 
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, and a court in the 
enforcing state may make its own determination for purposes 
of refusing enforcement.130 Moreover, the Tribunal’s decision, 
purporting to apply English procedural law and recognizing 
London as the only seat of the arbitration, is not entitled to 
deference because it “manifestly disregarded the parties’ 
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agreement [and] the law.”131 Again, the parties expressly 
agreed to conduct the arbitration “under the rules of the 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,” and the GSPA 
makes no reference whatsoever to English law.132 
  Nor does Nigeria’s decision to apply for annulment 
both in England and Nigeria conflict with its rights under the 
arbitration agreement or the New York Convention. 
Considering that the parties expressly agreed on Nigerian 
procedural law, the only relevant decision on annulment is 
the Nigerian judgment. Nevertheless, even if London were 
ultimately accepted as one of the seats of the arbitration, the 
Nigerian court would nevertheless retain “primary 
jurisdiction” as a competent authority in the country “under 
the law of which, that award was made.”133 Thus, Nigeria 
always had a right to seek annulment in the Nigerian courts, 
and that right did not dissipate when it filed to set aside the 
liability award in England. 
  In sum, because the liability award on which the 
damages award is premised was lawfully set aside by a court 
in Nigeria, a competent authority under Article V(1)(e), P&ID 
had no award to enforce and the D.C. district court lacks 
                                                 
 
 
131 Id. at 290. 
132 See Id. at 309 (finding that an express agreement on the procedural law 
rebuts any presumption that a different country’s procedural law applies); 
see also Belize Soc. Dev., 668 F.3d at 728 (finding that London was competent 
authority where the parties expressly agreed to “arbitration under  the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules”); Baker Marine, 
191 F.3d at 195 (applying Nigerian arbitration law pursuant to the parties’ 
express agreement); Dixilyn-Field Drilling, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17992, at 
*4 (same). 
133 See Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 308-09; RESTATEMENT § 5-12 cmt. b.  
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  The confirmation and subsequent enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards against sovereign states or their 
instrumentalities is a delicate issue as it can have political 
repercussions. Courts must therefore exercise utmost caution 
in exercising jurisdiction over sovereigns. In the United 
States, the FSIA provides the sole basis upon which U.S. 
courts may assume jurisdiction in a case that involves a 
foreign state. As discussed in this Note, some U.S. case law 
have interpreted several situations where the arbitration 
exception of the FSIA may be applicable. Most importantly, 
when the action before a U.S. court involves the confirmation 
of an award against a sovereign state, that court must, among 
other things, look to see if that award has been set aside by a 
court of the seat of the arbitration. If so, then there is no 
“existing award” to be confirmed by the court. Consequently, 
the court lacks jurisdiction as the foreign state’s immunity has 
not been successfully challenged because the arbitration 
exception does not apply. 
  Generally, Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention 
gives courts the discretion to go ahead and enforce an award 
that has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration. However, 
in the United States specifically, this discretion has been 
construed to only include situations where the decision 
setting aside such award is “tainted,” or where such a 
decision “offends fundamental notions of what is decent and 
just in the State where enforcement is sought.” Absent these 
circumstances, no other grounds exist currently under U.S. 
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law for U.S. courts to confirm an award that was vacated at 
the seat of arbitration.  
  In P&ID v. Nigeria, the Nigerian court vacated the 
award which was made pursuant to Nigerian law. The 
Nigerian court was the competent court to exercise such 
power, being the court that had supervisory jurisdiction over 
the arbitration. In other words, being the court of the seat of 
arbitration, the Nigerian court exercised appropriate 
jurisdictional competence to vacate the award rendered by 
the tribunal. Because the Nigerian court validly vacated the 
award, and there was no allegation that the judgment was 
tainted, or that it offends fundamental notions of what is 
decent and just in the United States (or any U.S. state where 
enforcement is sought), then there was no award for P&ID to 
confirm. Thus, the arbitration exception does not apply, and 
the D.C. district court cannot not validly exercise jurisdiction 
over Nigeria.  
   
